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QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether, to prove aggravated identity theft 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), the Government must 
show that the defendant knew that the means of 
identification he used belonged to another person. 
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 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
Petitioner Ignacio Flores-Figueroa respectfully 
petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit.  
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit (Pet. App. 1a-3a), is 
unpublished. 
JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered 
on April 23, 2008.  Pet. App. 1a.  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION 
In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A provides: 
§ 1028A. Aggravated identity theft 
(a) Offenses.-- 
 (1) In general.—Whoever, during and in 
relation to any felony violation enumerated in 
subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or 
uses, without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person shall, in addition to 
the punishment provided for such felony, be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years. 
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STATEMENT 
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) imposes a mandatory 
consecutive two-year sentence enhancement on 
anyone who, during and in relation to certain 
enumerated offenses, “knowingly transfers, 
possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means 
of identification of another person. . . .”1  In this case, 
                     
1 The enumerated offenses are listed in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A(c) and include violations of: 
(1) section 641 (relating to theft of public 
money, property, or rewards[1]), section 656 
(relating to theft, embezzlement, or misapplication 
by bank officer or employee), or section 664 (relating 
to theft from employee benefit plans); 
(2) section 911 (relating to false personation of 
citizenship); 
(3) section 922 (a)(6) (relating to false 
statements in connection with the acquisition of a 
firearm); 
(4) any provision contained in this chapter 
(relating to fraud and false statements), other than 
this section or section 1028(a)(7); 
(5) any provision contained in chapter 63 
(relating to mail, bank, and wire fraud); 
(6) any provision contained in chapter 69 
(relating to nationality and citizenship). 
(7) any provision contained in chapter 75 
(relating to passports and visas); 
(8) section 523 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(15 U.S.C. 6823) (relating to obtaining customer 
information by false pretenses); 
(9) section 243 or 266 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1253 and 1306) (relating 
to willfully failing to leave the United States after 
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petitioner acknowledged using, without lawful 
authority, false Social Security and Alien 
Registration numbers in order to obtain employment.   
However, he denied (without contradiction by the 
Government) knowing that the false identification 
numbers in fact belonged to some other actual 
person, as opposed to simply being fabricated 
numbers never issued by the Government to a real 
person.   
The question presented by this petition, upon 
which the courts of appeals are extensively divided, is 
whether a defendant “knowingly . . . uses, without 
lawful authority, a means of identification of another 
person” within the meaning of Section 1028A(a)(1) 
when he does not know that the identification he is 
using in fact belongs to another person.  
1. On April 17, 2000, petitioner, a citizen of 
Mexico, used a false Social Security number and 
Resident Alien card to obtain employment at a steel 
company.  U.S. C.A. Br. 3.  At the time, petitioner 
used the name Horatio Ramirez, but neither the 
                                           
deportation and creating a counterfeit alien 
registration card); 
 (10) any provision contained in chapter 8 of title II 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1321 
et seq.) (relating to various immigration offenses); or 
(11) section 208, 811, 1107(b), 1128B(a), or 1632 of 
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 408, 1011, 1307(b), 
1320a–7b(a), and 1383a) (relating to false statements 
relating to programs under the Act).  
[1] So in original. Probably should be “records”. 
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Social Security number nor the Resident Alien card 
had been issued to anyone of that name.  Id. at 1, 5.  
In fact, the Social Security number was invalid.  Id. 
at 5.2  
In 2006, petitioner desired to begin working 
under his real name.  He presented his employer 
with a new Social Security number, purportedly 
issued under petitioner’s name, and a Permanent 
Resident card with his name and a registration 
number.  U.S. C.A. Br. 3.  Both documents were 
forgeries purchased by petitioner from an individual 
in Chicago.  Id. at 5-6.  Suspicious, the company’s 
owner reported the request to U.S. Immigrations and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE).   
The ICE investigation revealed that none of the 
documents were issued to either petitioner or to his 
former alias, Horatio Ramirez.  Instead, the Social 
Security card bearing petitioner’s name used a 
number issued to a minor.  U.S. C.A. Br. 5.    The 
Permanent Resident card likewise bore a number 
that was issued to someone else.  Id.3  
3. In early 2006, a federal grand jury indicted 
petitioner on two counts of Misuse of an Immigration 
Document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546, and one 
count of Illegal Entry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325. 
The grand jury also indicted petitioner on two counts 
of Aggravated Identity Theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
                     
2 The record does not disclose whether the Resident Alien 
card number was valid or not. 
3 The record does not disclose any further details about the 
persons whose Social Security and Permanent Resident 
numbers were used on the cards bearing petitioner’s name. 
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§ 1028A, arising from his use of the Social Security 
and Permanent Resident cards purportedly issued in 
his own name.4  Pet. App. 2a; U.S. C.A. Br. 1.   
Petitioner pled guilty to both counts of Misuse of an 
Immigration Document and the sole count of Illegal 
Entry.  Petitioner pled not guilty to the two counts of 
Aggravated Identity Theft and consented to a bench 
trial.  U.S. C.A. Br. 1. 
At trial, petitioner admitted that the documents 
were never issued to him, but testified that he 
purchased the identification documents without any 
knowledge that the numbers they bore belonged to 
real people.  U.S. C.A. Br. 5.   
At the close of evidence, petitioner argued that 
the Government had failed to prove aggravated 
identity theft because it had not presented any 
evidence to contradict his testimony that he did not 
know that the means of identification he had used 
belonged to “another person,” as required by Section 
1028A(a)(1).  Pet. App. 2a.  The district court rejected 
petitioner’s construction of the statute, agreeing with 
the Government that no such proof was required.  
Accordingly, the court found petitioner guilty and 
sentenced him to seventy-five months imprisonment, 
twenty-four of which were the result of the Section 
1028A enhancement.  Id. at 2a-3a. 
                     
4 Because the original Social Security card bearing the 
name Horatio Ramirez did not, in fact, belong to “another 
person,” as required by Section 1028A(a)(1), petitioner was not 
charged with Aggravated Identity Theft with respect to that 
document.  Likewise, petitioner was not charged with 
Aggravated Identity Theft with respect to the original false 
Resident Alien card. 
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4. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the 
Eighth Circuit, renewing his argument that § 1028A 
requires proof that the defendant knew that the 
identification he used belongs to another person.  Pet. 
App. 3a.  The court of appeals summarily affirmed, 
explaining that it had recently “resolved this issue 
and determined that under the plain language of the 
statute, ‘knowingly’ modified only the verbs 
‘transfers, possesses, or uses,’ and not the phrase ‘of 
another person.’”   Id. (citing United States v. 
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008), 
petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 15, 2008) (No. 08-
5316)).    
In that prior decision, the Eighth Circuit 
acknowledged that its construction of the statute, 
while consistent with the law of the Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuits, conflicts with a decision of the 
D.C. Circuit.  Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915-16 
(citing United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 
1234 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Hurtado, 508 
F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008); United States v. Montejo, 442 
F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2006)).   
5.  This petition followed. 
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT  
This case presents the Court an opportunity to 
resolve an ever-widening circuit split on an important 
and recurring question of federal law.  Indeed, in the 
five days prior to the filing of this petition, the 
division over the mens rea requirement of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A(a)(1), has grown from the 3-1 split 
acknowledged by the Eighth Circuit at the time of 
petitioner’s appeal to a 3-3 conflict that shows no sign 
of abating.    
Three courts of appeals now hold that 
“aggravated identity theft” under Section 1028A(a)(1) 
occurs only when the defendant knows that the 
means of identification he is using in fact belongs to 
another person.   Three other circuits hold the 
opposite.  This division of authority is considered, 
entrenched, and untenable.   The question presented 
arises frequently, particularly in the context of 
immigration prosecutions when, as in this case, a 
defendant seeking employment obtains a false Social 
Security number without knowing whether the 
number is simply made up and belongs to no one, or 
in fact matches the number assigned by the 
Government to another person.  The continued 
disparate application of the severe penalties of 
Section 1028A(a)(1) to similarly situated defendants 
should not endure.   Accordingly, this Court should 
grant certiorari in this case to resolve the conflict and 
restore uniformity to this important area of federal 
law.   
8 
I. Six Courts Of Appeals Are Evenly Divided 
Over The Scope Of The Mens Rea 
Requirement Of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). 
1.  In the past two years, six courts of appeals 
have considered the mens rea requirement of Section 
1028A(a)(1), dividing evenly into two diametrically 
opposed camps. 
First, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. The First, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have each held that the 
knowledge requirement of Section 1028A(a)(1) 
extends to the “of another person” element of the 
offense, requiring the Government to prove that the 
defendant did not simply invent a false identification 
number in cases such as this, but knew that he was 
using the means of identification belonging to 
another actual person.  See United States v. Godin, 
No. 07-2332, 2008 WL 2780646,  at *1 (1st Cir. July 
18, 2008) (“[W]e hold that the ‘knowingly’ mens rea 
requirement extends to ‘of another person.’  In other 
words, to obtain a conviction under § 1028A(a)(1), the 
government must prove that the defendant knew that 
the means of identification transferred, possessed, or 
used during the commission of an enumerated felony 
belonged to another person.”); United States v. 
Miranda-Lopez, No. 07-50123, 2008 WL 2762392, at 
*5 (9th Cir. July 17, 2008) (“[W]e thus hold that the 
government was required to prove that Miranda-
Lopez knew that the identification belonged to 
another person.”); United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 
515 F.3d 1234, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e hold that 
section 1028A(a)(1)’s mens rea requirement extends 
to the phrase ‘of another person,’ meaning that the 
government must prove the defendant actually knew 
9 
the identification in question belonged to someone 
else.”). 
These courts have rejected the assertion that the 
word “knowingly” should be read as modifying only 
the verbs that follow it.  The D.C. Circuit, for 
example, has pointed out that “the Model Penal Code 
adopts as a general principle of construction a rule 
under which, absent evidence to the contrary, the 
mens rea requirement encompasses all material 
elements of an offense.” Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 
at 1239 (citing Model Penal Code § 2.02(4) (1985)).  
See also Godin, 2008 WL 2780646, at *4 (“In criminal 
statutes, adverbs that are also mens rea 
requirements frequently extend to non-verbs.”) 
(collecting examples).  In fact, the D.C. Circuit 
observed that even the Government admitted that 
the knowledge requirement of Section 1028A(a)(1) 
extends beyond the verbs in the provision, requiring 
proof at the very least that the defendant knew that 
what he was using was a “means of identification.” 
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1238.   
Whether the knowledge requirement extends all 
the way to the phrase “of another person,” these 
three circuits have found, is a question upon which 
the statutory text is ambiguous.  See Godin, 2008 WL 
2780646, at *5; Miranda-Lopez, 2008 WL 2762392, at 
*4; Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1243.   That 
conclusion, these courts believe, is supported by this 
Court’s decision in Liparota v. United States, 471 
U.S. 419 (1985), which found that a similar 
formulation was “ambiguous” “[a]s a matter of 
grammar” because “it is not at all clear how far down 
the sentence the word ‘knowingly’ is intended to 
travel.” Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424-25 n.7; see 
10 
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1241; Godin, 2008 WL 
2780646, at *5;  Miranda-Lopez, 2008 WL 2762392, 
at *3-*4. 
Turning to other indicia of legislative intent, 
these circuits have noted that the structure, title 
(“Aggravated identity theft”), and basic purposes of 
the provision (as illustrated in the legislative history) 
either undermine the Government’s reading or do not 
resolve the textual ambiguity.  The D.C. Circuit has 
concluded that these sources show that the essence of 
the crime defined in Section 1028A(a)(1) is 
intentional theft and that when a defendant simply 
acquires an identification number (like a made-up 
Social Security number) that fortuitously belongs to 
someone else, “it is odd – and borders on the absurd – 
to call what [the defendant] did ‘theft.’” 515 F.3d at 
1246 (citation omitted).  The First and Ninth Circuits 
have agreed that the legislative history tends to 
support this view, but ultimately concluded that the 
history as a whole was inconclusive.  Godin, 2008 WL 
2780646, at *7-*8; Miranda-Lopez, 2008 WL 2762392, 
at *4.  
Because they found the text of the statute 
ambiguous – and concluded that the structure, 
history, and purposes of the provision failed to 
resolve the ambiguity – the First and Ninth Circuits 
applied the rule of lenity to decide the statutory 
question in favor of the defendant. Godin, 2008 WL 
2780646, at *8; Miranda-Lopez, 2008 WL 2762392 at 
*5.  Although the D.C. Circuit reached the same 
conclusion based on its reading of the text in light of 
the statute’s structure, purposes, and legislative 
history, Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1246, it also 
stated that “if we harbored any doubt about this . . . 
11 
we would turn to the rule of lenity to resolve the 
dispute,” id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. Three 
other circuits have considered the same essential 
arguments and reached the opposite conclusion.  See 
United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 
915 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the Government 
was not required to prove that Mendoza-Gonzalez 
knew that [the person whose name and social 
security number he used] was a real person to prove 
he violated § 1028A(a)(1)”), petition for cert. filed, 
(U.S. July 15, 2008) (No. 08-5316); United States v. 
Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 610 (11th Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam) (holding that that “§ 1028A(a)(1) [does] not 
require the government to prove that [a defendant] 
knew that the means of identification he possessed 
and used belonged to another actual person”), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008); United States v. 
Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that “the defendant need not be aware of the actual 
assignment of the [identification] numbers to an 
individual to have violated the statute”). 
These courts have reasoned that the adverb 
“knowingly” is most sensibly read as modifying solely 
the verbs that follow – “transfers, possesses, or uses” 
– and not the broader object of those verbs (i.e., 
“means of identification of another person”).  See 
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915; Hurtado, 508 
F.3d at 609; Montejo, 442 F.3d at 215.  The courts 
have acknowledged that this Court has given a 
broader reach to the knowingness requirement of 
similarly structured statutory provisions in cases like 
Liparota.  But they distinguish such cases as resting 
12 
on a concern, absent here, about criminalizing 
otherwise innocent conduct.  See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 
520 F.3d at 917; Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609-10; 
Montejo, 442 F.3d at 216.  
All three circuits thus have found the statute 
unambiguous.  See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 916; 
Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 610 n.8; Montejo, 442 F.3d at 
217.   Thus, none relies on legislative history, 
although the Eighth Circuit has indicated that it 
would view that history as supporting its reading of 
the text.  See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 916-17.  
And because they found the text of the statute clear, 
the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have declined to 
apply the rule of lenity to construe the statute in a 
manner more favorable to defendants.  Hurtado, 508 
F.3d at 610 n.8; Montejo, 442 F.3d at 217. 
2. Writing separately in Godin, Judge Lynch 
persuasively argued that the time has come for this 
Court to resolve the circuit conflict:  
It would be beneficial if the Supreme Court 
resolved the mens rea issue. The circuit 
conflict is certainly ripe. And there are a 
large number of district court opinions on the 
issue. The issue is important and affects a 
large number of cases and a large number of 
defendants. For each of those defendants, an 
additional mandatory two-year sentence 
makes a great deal of difference. 
2008 WL 2780646, at * 10 (Lynch, C.J., concurring). 
This Court should heed Judge Lynch’s call.  The 
circuit conflict is considered, mature, and ripe for 
resolution.  Each of the six circuits has given the 
question presented extensive, thoughtful 
consideration.  The courts have acknowledged each 
13 
other’s holdings and reasoning, but have been unable 
to agree on the meaning of the statute.5  As a result, 
there is no reasonable prospect that the division will 
be resolved without this Court’s intervention.  
Indeed, two of the circuits have denied petitions for 
rehearing en banc, one on each side of the split.  See 
United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234 
(D.C. Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, (June 13, 
2008); United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 
912, 915 (8th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, (May 1, 
2008).   
                     
5 See Godin, 2008 WL 2780646, at * 3 (First Circuit noting 
that the “circuits are divided on the issue” and citing the 
decisions of the Fourth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits); id. 
at *4 (explaining basis for its disagreement with the Fourth, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); id. at *6-*8 (disagreeing with 
the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the provision’s structure, title, 
and legislative history resolve the ambiguity); Miranda-Lopez, 
2008 WL 2762392, at *4 (Ninth Circuit acknowledging split 
between D.C. Circuit and the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, and declaring that “we follow the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning”); Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915-16 (Eighth 
Circuit noting decisions of the Fourth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits); id. at 916 (“We acknowledge that we have reached a 
different conclusion than the D.C. Circuit” and explaining why); 
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1242 (D.C. Circuit acknowledging 
“that the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in 
[Montejo]” and that “the Eleventh Circuit, along with several 
district courts, has adopted this interpretation,” but concluding 
that “[w]e respectfully disagree with Montejo” and explaining 
why);  Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609 (finding support in the Fourth 
Circuit’s resolution of the question).  Moreover, two of the 
decisions have generated dissents, further airing the arguments 
in favor of the conflicting readings of the statutes.  See Miranda-
Lopez, 2008 WL 2762392, at *7-*10 (Bybee, J., dissenting); 
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1250-61 (Henderson, J., 
dissenting). 
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Moreover, no purpose would be served by further 
percolation.  By and large, the decisions have 
addressed the same set of arguments regarding the 
text, purposes and legislative history of the Act, as 
well as the meaning of this Court’s decisions in cases 
like Liparota.  Given the thoroughness of the 
opinions already issued, it is unlikely that future 
decisions in other circuits will shed significant light 
on the debate. 
In addition, as Judge Lynch observed, the 
question is recurring and important: 
A large number of cases are involved. The 
range of underlying felonies that can trigger 
this offense is broad.  To give but a few 
examples of the scope of the issue, this 
offense can be charged when an unlawful 
means of identification is used in the course 
of Social Security fraud, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A(c)(11), passport fraud, id. 
§ 1028A(c)(7), theft of public property, id. 
§ 1028A(c)(1), fraud in the acquisition of a 
firearm, id. § 1028A(c)(3) , citizenship fraud, 
id. § 1028A(c)(2), and other crimes. 
Godin, 2008 WL 2780646, at *10 (Lynch, C.J., 
concurring).  In 2005, an FBI official testified before 
Congress that the Bureau had over 1600 open 
investigations into identity theft and expected the 
number of grow.6  Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising 
                     
6 See Securing Electronic Personal Data: Striking a Balance 
Between Privacy and Commercial and Governmental Use, Before 
the Subcomm. on Corrections and Rehabilitation of the S. Comm 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (Statement of Chris 
Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, 
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that six circuits have addressed the meaning of 
Section 1028A(a)(1)’s mens rea requirement in the 
past two years alone.  
Finally, the present division of authority is unfair 
and untenable.  Individuals committing precisely the 
same acts are subject to significantly different 
sentences depending on accidents of geography.  The 
disparity is exacerbated by the fact that Congress 
took pains to ensure that defendants subject to 
Section 1028A(a)(1) would serve the entirety of the 
two-year additional sentence on top of the sentence 
received for their predicate offense.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A(b) (requiring sentence be served 
consecutively to any other sentence and prohibiting 
courts from placing defendants convicted under this 
provision on probation).  If the Government’s 
construction of the statute is wrong, defendants in 
three circuits are serving sentences substantially 
harsher than Congress intended.  On the other hand, 
if the Government’s view is correct, Congress’s intent 
to harshly punish aggravated identity theft often will 
be thwarted, including in the Ninth Circuit, the most 
populous circuit in the country. 
3.  This case presents an ideal vehicle for 
resolving the circuit conflict.  The statutory question 
was the principal basis for dispute in the district 
court and the sole question presented on appeal.  Pet. 
App. 3a.  Moreover, the question is dispositive of 
petitioner’s conviction.  Petitioner does not dispute 
that his conviction was lawful unless the Government 
                                           
Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1437&wit_id=4162. 
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was required to prove that he knew that the Social 
Security or Permanent Resident registration number 
he used belonged to another actual person.  At the 
same time, the Government acknowledged on appeal 
that petitioner “testified that he purchased the 
means of identification in Chicago and did not know 
that they were issued to real people.” U.S. CA Br. 6.  
And the Government did not claim to have presented 
any evidence to contradict that testimony at trial.  
II. A Defendant Does Not Knowingly Commit 
Aggravated Identity Theft Unless He Knows 
That The Means Of Identification He Is 
Using Belongs To Another Person. 
Certiorari is also warranted because the decision 
below is wrong, conflicting with both the best reading 
of Section 1028A(a)(1) and the rule of lenity. 
1.  The text of Section 1028A(a)(1) is ambiguous 
as to the scope of its knowledge requirement.  The 
word “knowingly” could apply to one or more of four 
aspects of the offense, as the provision applies to 
anyone who “knowingly [1] transfers, posseses, or 
uses, [2] without lawful authority, [3] a means of 
identification [4] of another person.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A(a)(1).    
It is at least grammatically possible that the 
provision requires only that the defendant knew that 
his actions constituted “transferring, possessing, or 
using” something, and that Congress did not care 
whether the defendant knew that the thing was a 
means of identification, or that he lacked lawful 
authority for his action, or that the identification 
belonged to someone else.  But this Court’s 
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precedents demonstrate that this is surely not the 
only, or even the most plausible, reading. 
Confronted with a similarly constructed provision 
in Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), this 
Court recognized the inherent textual ambiguity in 
such formulations.  There, the Court construed a 
statute criminally punishing anyone who “knowingly 
uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses [food 
stamps] in any manner not authorized by” law.  Id. at 
420 n.1 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1982)).  The 
Government argued that the prosecution was 
required to prove only that the defendant knowingly 
“use[d], transfer[ed], acquire[d], alter[ed], or 
possesse[d]” the food stamps in a manner that – 
known to the defendant or not – happened to violate 
federal law.  Id. at 423.  The defendant argued that 
the knowledge requirement extended through the 
entire clause, requiring the Government to show that 
he also knew that the manner in which he using the 
food stamps was not authorized by law.  Id.  
Importantly for the present discussion, the Court 
found the language of the statute – which took the 
same form as Section 1028A(a)(1), using “knowingly” 
before a series of verbs followed by a direct object and 
a further limiting phrase – to be grammatically 
ambiguous: 
Although Congress certainly intended by use 
of the word “knowingly” to require some 
mental state with respect to some element of 
the crime defined in § 2024(b)(1), the 
interpretations proffered by both parties 
accord with congressional intent to this 
extent. Beyond this, the words themselves 
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provide little guidance. Either interpretation 
would accord with ordinary usage. 
471 U.S. at 424 (emphasis in original).  The Court 
then noted that one “treatise has aptly summed up 
the ambiguity in an analogous situation:” 
Still further difficulty arises from the 
ambiguity which frequently exists concerning 
what the words or phrases in question 
modify. What, for instance, does “knowingly” 
modify in a sentence from a “blue sky” law 
criminal statute punishing one who 
‘knowingly sells a security without a permit’ 
from the securities commissioner?  To be 
guilty must the seller of a security without a 
permit know only that what he is doing 
constitutes a sale, or must he also know that 
the thing he sells is a security, or must he 
also know that he has no permit to sell the 
security he sells? As a matter of grammar the 
statute is ambiguous; it is not at all clear how 
far down the sentence the word “knowingly” 
is intended to travel – whether it modifies 
“sells,” or “sells a security,” or “sells a security 
without a permit.”  
Id. at 424 n.7 (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, 
Criminal Law § 27 (1972)).  
The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits 
nonetheless have insisted that the text of Section 
1028A(a)(1) is unambiguous, but their reasons are 
unpersuasive.  These courts have asserted that 
because “knowingly” is an adverb, and located 
proximate to the words “transfers, possesses, or 
uses,” it must be understood to apply only to those 
verbs.   See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915; 
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Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 309; Montejo, 442 F.3d at 215.  
But this Court recognized in Liparota that this is not 
true.  471 U.S. at 424 (noting of similarly constructed 
provision, “the words themselves provide little 
guidance” as to the reach of the knowingness 
requirement).7  As the First Circuit rightly observed, 
“[c]ases holding that ‘knowingly’ extends to words 
and phrases other than verbs are legion.”  Godin, 
2008 WL 2780646, at * 4 (collecting cases).  To take 
but one example, no one could reasonably think that 
the federal statute criminalizing “knowingly . . . 
possess[ing] with intent to manufacture, distribute, 
or dispense, a controlled substance,” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1), would apply to a delivery truck driver 
who knew he was transporting for distribution some 
kind of substance, but did not know that the sealed 
packaged in his vehicle contained cocaine.  Yet that 
would be the consequence of a rule applying the 
                     
7 The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits insist that 
Liparota is inapposite because its construction of the knowledge 
requirement in 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) was intended to avoid 
criminalizing innocent conduct.  Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 
917; Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609; Montejo, 442 F.3d at 213.  That 
description of the basis of the Court’s decisions is incorrect; the 
Court made clear that the concern about innocent conduct was 
simply one of several factors, including the rule of lenity, 
supporting its holding.  Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426-27.  But more 
importantly for present purposes, it was only because the Court 
found the text of the statute ambiguous that it was required to 
turn to other considerations like lenity and avoiding the 
criminalization of seemingly innocent conduct.  Id. at 424.   That 
textual conclusion was driven by the Court’s recognition of the 
inherent ambiguity of the formulation used in the statute before 
it – a formulation repeated in Section 1028A(a)(1) – rather than 
by any policy concern.  Id. at 424-25, 430. 
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adverb “knowingly” only to the verbs in Section 
841(a)(1). 
Equally absurd results would follow from 
applying the knowledge requirement of Section 
1028A(a)(1) only to the provision’s verbs.  Take, for 
example, a person who knowingly transfers an 
envelope from one person to another, having been 
told, and in fact reasonably believing, that it contains 
a birthday card when it really contains a stolen 
Social Security card.  See United States v. Godin, 476 
F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D. Me. 2007).  If the knowledge 
requirement in Section 1028A(a)(1) extends only to 
the provision’s verbs, criminal liability would attach.  
But not even the Government believes that this is a 
sensible reading of the statute.  In the D.C. Circuit 
the Government acknowledged that “the mens rea 
requirement must extend at least to the direct 
object’s principal modifier, ‘of identification.’”  
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1238. 
Having made that reasonable concession, it is  
difficult to see how the Government can maintain 
that, as a linguistic matter, the knowledge 
requirement can only be read to extend to “means of 
identification” but not to the qualifying phrase “of 
another person.”  That is, once the word “knowingly” 
is “emancipated from merely modifying the verbs,” 
then “as a matter of grammar it is difficult to 
conclude that the word ‘knowingly’ modifies one of 
the elements in [the subsection,] but not the other.”  
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 
77-78 (1994).  At the very least, the reach of the 
knowledge requirement is textually ambiguous. 
The circuits accepting the Government’s 
construction have also noted that Congress could 
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have written the provision to unambiguously extend 
the knowledge requirement to the “of another person 
element.”  See, e.g., Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 
915; Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609.  Congress could, for 
example, have applied the provisions to one who 
“knowingly transfers, posses, or uses, what he knows 
to be a means of identification belong to another 
known person, knowing that he lacked lawful 
authority to do so.”  But that kind of repetition is 
awkward and inconsistent with common usage, as 
would be a provision making abundantly clear that 
the knowledge requirement applies only to the verbs 
(e.g., “knowingly transfers, posses, or uses something 
which, whether known to him or not, is a means of 
identification of another person used without lawful 
authority”).  In the end, the construction Congress 
did use is consistent with common usage, but 
inherently ambiguous.   
2.  This Court must resolve the statutory 
ambiguity in favor of lenity unless “resort to ‘the 
language and structure, legislative history, and 
motivating policies’ of the statute” removes all 
“reasonable doubt . . . about [the] statute’s intended 
scope.”  Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 
(1990); see, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427.  In this 
case, those considerations support the interpretation 
lenity would otherwise require. 
a.  Legal Backdrop.  Section 1028A(a)(1) must be 
read in light of a legal tradition that ordinarily 
imputes the mens rea requirement of a statute to 
each of its elements, unless there is some good reason 
to do otherwise.  See Model Penal Code § 2.02(4) 
(1985) (“When the law defining an offense prescribes 
the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the 
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commission of an offense, without distinguishing 
among the material elements thereof, such provision 
shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, 
unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”); X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 70 (reading criminal 
statute in light of “our cases interpreting criminal 
statutes to include broadly applicable scienter 
requirements”) (emphasis added). To be sure, that 
presumption can be overcome, but as discussed next, 
nothing in the structure, history, or purposes of the 
statute points strongly in favor of an unusual reading 
here. 
b. Structure.  The subsection immediately 
following Section 1028A(a)(1) provides: 
(2) Terrorism offense.--Whoever, during and 
in relation to any felony violation enumerated 
in section 2332b(g)(5)(B), knowingly 
transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of 
another person or a false identification 
document shall, in addition to the 
punishment provided for such felony, be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5 
years. 
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
Two aspects of this provision render the 
Government’s construction of Section 1028A(a)(1) 
untenable. 
First, the italicized language makes clear that in 
the case of terrorism offenses, it is enough that the 
defendant knew that his identification document was 
false, regardless of whether or not he knew that the 
identification belonged to another person.  Congress 
thus knew how to make irrelevant the defendant’s 
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knowledge of whether the identification he used 
belonged to another, and did so in an immediately 
adjoining subsection of the statute.   
Second, in the D.C. Circuit, the Government 
conceded that the knowledge requirement in the 
terrorism offense provision extended to the phrase 
“false identification document,” such that the 
defendant would have to know that the document 
was false in order to commit the offense under that 
prong of the provision.  Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 
129.  But that concession requires the Court to 
believe one of two implausible propositions: (a) that 
the knowledge requirement in Section 1028A(a)(2) 
hopscotches among the provision’s various elements, 
landing on the verbs and the words “means of 
identification” before leaping over “of another person” 
to alight on “false identification document”; or (b) 
that the knowledge requirement applies to the “of 
another person” element in the terrorism offense 
provision but not in its immediate predecessor 
provision, Section 1028A(a)(1). Because identical 
neighboring clauses in a statute should be read in a 
consistent manner, neither view is plausible. 
c.  Purposes and Legislative History.  The 
purposes and legislative history of the provision 
further support petitioner’s reading.  The title of the 
provision is “Aggravated identity theft,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A.  The word “theft” implies the knowing 
acquisition of the property of another.8  Thus, for 
                     
8 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “theft” as the “felonious 
taking and removing of another's personal property with the 
intent of depriving the true owner of it.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 
1516 (8th ed. 2004).   
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example, one who takes in a cat, believing that it is a 
stray, does not commit “theft” as commonly 
understood simply because it turns out that the cat in 
fact belongs to someone else.  It is the thief’s 
knowledge that the taken property belongs to another 
that distinguishes misappropriation from thievery.  
See, e.g., United States v. Hurt, 527 F.3d 1347, 1350 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (theft requires specific intent to take 
possession of the property of another); W. LaFave, 
Substantive Criminal Law § 19.5(a) (2d ed. 2003) 
(same).  Likewise, when a person makes up a Social 
Security number, having no idea whether it belongs 
to someone else, it is hard to see how that conduct 
qualifies as “theft” – much less “aggravated theft” – 
within the ordinary meaning of those terms. 
The legislative history likewise demonstrates 
that Congress was focused on the problem of 
intentional identity theft, not unintentional 
misappropriation.  Pursuant to the Identity Theft 
Penalty Enhancement Act, H.R. 1731, 108th Cong. 
(2004), in 2004 Congress modified § 1028A to 
“address[] the growing problem of identity theft. . . 
[including that] many identity thieves receive short 
terms of imprisonment or probation.” H.R. Rep. No. 
108-528, at 3 (2004), as reprinted in 2004 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780 (emphasis added).  The 
practices Congress focused on all involved the 
intentional theft of the identification of known 
individuals.  Thus, the House Report emphasized 
that because of the large number of complaints to the 
Federal Trade Commission from victims whose 
information was pilfered, “we must try to find new 
ways to combat” not only such unsophisticated 
practices as “dumpster diving,” but also theft of 
“information that was originally collected for an 
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authorized purpose,” including database hacking and 
illicit employee access to confidential information.  
Id. at 4-5.  Indeed, all of the specific examples cited in 
the House Report “involved defendants who . . . knew 
the identification they used belonged to another.” 
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1244 (describing that 
all of the specific examples cited in the House Report 
“involved defendants who . . . knew the identification 
they used belonged to another”).  And although some 
examples may be clearer than others, see Godin, 2008 
WL 2780646, at *7, at the very least none plainly 
encompasses a case in which a defendant simply used 
an identification number that, unbeknownst to him, 
turned out to have been assigned to another person.  
See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1245. 
 The distinction between theft and unknowing 
misappropriation is not a technicality, but instead 
goes to the core of what Congress found to be so 
especially culpable as to warrant additional, and 
quite severe, punishment as “aggravated identity 
theft.”  The focus on intentional theft illustrates that 
Congress was principally concerned in this provision 
not with addressing fraud, which is punished 
severely elsewhere,9 but rather with recognizing the 
additional level of culpability that arises when a 
defendant knowingly seeks to use a means of 
identification that belongs to another person and, 
therefore, intentionally risks inflicting special harms 
on the person whose identity the defendant steals.  
                     
9  For example, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1546, punishing 
“Fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents,” are 
punishable by up to a ten years’ imprisonment for a first 
offense.  Id. § 1546(a). 
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Indeed, the legislative history focuses extensively on 
that potential harm. See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 
at 1243-44 (collecting examples). 
Of course, an individual sometimes can be 
harmed by accidental misappropriation of his means 
of identification as well.  But that does not change 
the fact that the degree of a defendant’s culpability 
turns most critically on the state of his intentions.10  
Put simply, someone who intends to steal another’s 
identity is worthy of greater punishment than one 
who unintentionally picks an identification number 
out of thin air that happens to match one already 
issued to someone else.  To be sure, both defendants 
have engaged in culpable conduct in using a false 
identification.  But the purpose of the sentencing 
enhancement in Section 1028A(a)(1) is to provide 
additional punishment when that fraud also amounts 
to identity theft, a concept commonly understood to 
encompass the intentional taking of property known 
to belong to another. 
Applying the knowledge requirement to the “of 
another person” element thus tracks the distinction 
most relevant to culpability.  The Government, on the 
other hand, would mete out extraordinary 
punishment not on the basis of anything the 
                     
10 Moreover, the risk of harm to the victim is more 
significant when the misappropriation is intentional – a 
defendant like petitioner, who uses false identification to secure 
employment with no intention of stealing anyone’s identity, 
surely is less dangerous than is a defendant who seeks out 
Social Security numbers and other identification belonging to 
real people, often in order to facilitate absconding with their 
money or misusing their credit. 
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defendant intended, but rather based on the random 
happenstance that some defendants acquire Social 
Security numbers that happen not to have been 
assigned yet, while others are not so lucky.   
3.  Even if it is possible to hypothesize a Congress 
that would have intended such a result, such 
speculation is an insufficient basis for resolving a 
textual ambiguity in a criminal statute against the 
defendant.  “When interpreting a criminal statute,” 
this Court does not “play the part of a mind reader.”  
United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2008) 
(plurality opinion).  Instead, in choosing between 
plausible constructions of a criminal statute, “it is 
appropriate, before we choose the harsher 
alternative, to require that Congress should have 
spoken in language that is clear and definite.”  
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly, 
when “Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of 
imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the 
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.”  Bell 
v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).   
In this case, at the very least, consideration of the 
structure, history and purposes of Section 
1028A(a)(1) does not decisively resolve the textual 
ambiguity in favor of the Government.11  The rule of 
lenity therefore requires rejection of the 
                     
11 Indeed, none of the circuits accepting the Government’s 
view have done so on the strength of the legislative history, 
strcture, or purposes of the statute.  Instead, all have found – 
incorrectly – that the statutory language was unambiguous.  See 
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915; Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 608; 
Montejo, 442 F.3d at 217. 
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Government’s interpretation and reversal of 
petitioner’s conviction. 
CONCLUSION  
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ 
of certiorari should be granted.   
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